Monday, April 3, 2017

Investigating 25 March 1948

For nearly the entire month of March, 1948, individuals in charge of our nation’s National Security struggled with the possibility of "atomic" war with the Soviets. It has been generally described, in various historical works, as the “March Crisis”1. In fact, global ideological struggles in that time-period demanded that United States security experts pay close attention to everything going on. Included in this were many strange incidents of unknown airborne object sightings across the United States.2

By late 1949, stories began circulating about a Flying Disc, of unknown origin, landing on a mesa in New Mexico. This author suggests that the reader check out the now definitive book on the subject: The Aztec UFO Incident, by Scott and Suzanne Ramsey, and Frank Thayer, PhD. Per their research, this incident occurred on March 25, 1948. Surely the possibility must be considered that there is some sort of connection between this incident and the March crisis of 1948. Either the disc was truly of unknown origin, or perhaps it was part of the ongoing Soviet deception plan underway, at that time.

Stress regarding Soviet intensions began in January, but formerly classified historical reports maintain that the crisis began on the 5th, when General Lucius Clay sent an urgent telegram to the Head of the Army Intelligence Division, General Chamberlin*. In it he noted a striking change in the Russians’ behavior**. From Secretary Forrestal’s diary, for 5 March 1948:
“FROM CLAY EYES ONLY TO CHAMBERLIN…I HAVE FELT A SUBTLE CHANGE IN SOVIET ATTITUDE WHICH I CANNOT DEFINE BUT WHICH NOW GIVES ME A FEELING THAT IT (war) MAY COME WITH DRAMATIC SUDDENNESS.”

From the 5th through the 25th, tensions in Washington, in regards to possible Soviet aggression, rose and fell. While this writer thinks it unlikely that the "disc" that is said to have landed in New Mexico, on the 25th, was a Soviet trick, it is also true that the Soviet Russians were deeply embroiled in a rather intense deception plan at that time, the goal of which being to drive the western powers out of Berlin. The Russians, timing their deception to coincide with other bold moves they were behind, attempted to convince those observing that they were pulling together a large invasion force, on the Berlin border.3

The deception seemed to work briefly, and it seemed to result in General Carl Spaatz issuing a world-wide air defense alert on the 25th/26th.4 Cooler heads prevailed and it soon became clear that it was all a ruse. Most of the Intelligence experts of the time, including Admiral Hillenkoetter, did not agree with the March 5th assessment, and did not see the Russians as being prepared for a major war.5 Never-the-less, no one wanted to take a chance on another Pearl Harbor event.

Considering that it was almost entirely the Air Force, and head of Army Intelligence, General Stephen J. Chamberlin, who seemed vastly more concerned than anyone else, the question must be asked: Why? When other major players in the National Security arena were all dismayed, at their level of concern, why was the Air Force so alarmed?6
*In the definitive account of Defense Secretary Forrestal’s life and work, Driven Patriot (©1992 by Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley), namely in the Chapter entitled: “The War Scare”, it is noted that General Clay’s letter to the President had been more so inspired by a visit from the “visiting Director of Army Intelligence, Lieutenant General Stephen Chamberlin” than the abrupt change in attitude by the Soviets** Ibid; Page 225, Paragraph 2


It is an admittedly odd coincidence that the disc was reported to have fallen on the 25th, and that just happens to be the same date that General Spaatz ordered the air defense alert. If the disc was not Russian, what was its origin? What would have been the purpose of flying around in the United States' airspace, only to crash land in New Mexico? Were they non-terrestrials, worried about the proliferation of our atomic weapons? After all, from June 1947 through June 1948, our stockpile grew from 13 to 50**. Were these non-terrestrials monitoring the "March crisis", or was it part of a different type of deception game, run by an American office specializing in such things?

One could suppose that the disc was a hoax perpetrated by Washington insiders who wanted to force the President into giving the Air Force its larger funding request, and to institute Universal Military Training (UMT), which the President was opposed to.

Colonel Riley Ennis7 had been Chief/Intelligence Group of the United States Army, General Staff Corps, at the time in question. He authored a directive with world-wide distribution to all the major air defense units. This directive created or enhanced the code 452.1, with control number A-1917, on 25 March, which ordered the Air Material Command at Wright Patterson AFB to collect “Unconventional Aircraft” and "Flying Disc" reports, for the GSC's Intelligence Division.8 He was also a proponent of UMT.

Could he possibly have been participating in a deception plan meant for the President? Might Ennis and fellow "conspirators" in the Intelligence community simply have been trying to use a potential "invasion of America" scenario to build support for more Defense spending? To this writer, that possibility seems like more of a stretch than anything that has ever been considered before. Would the Intelligence Department of the USA/GSC, especially the Intelligence Group, headed by Colonel Ennis, have had the where-with-all to create such a convincing alien crew and ship that would have successfully fooled everyone involved with the recovery? And even if one thought the answer to that question was "yes," the next big question would be: "did it work"? The answer to that question would have to be no. The individuals pushing Truman for such an increase in the budget only got some of what they wanted, and even that was only because of the perceived Russian aggression in Berlin and elsewhere. It certainly does not appear that it was because we thought they had Flying Discs at the ready.

What the record clearly shows us is this:
1. By the 15th, the Intelligence Community had begun to address the problem dealing with its abilities to coordinate Intelligence summaries and the better over-all sharing of their world situational views.9

2. General Clay was interviewed on the 25th, and said he did not expect any major move from the Soviets10

3. General Carl Spaatz ordered a global Air Defense alert, beginning on the 25th. On the 26th he participated in a tele-conference, making his wishes and orders clear.11

4. Although the 26th is the date sometimes sited, in standard historical material, as the date for the Air Alert, the USA/GSC, ID letter of Instruction 452.1, with control number A-1917, was issued on the 25th, and it was drafted for world-wide distribution. Air Defense Command (ADC) order 45-5 was issued on the same day. Continental Air Command (CoNAC) letter of instruction 200-1 along with Tactical Air Command (TAC) letter 200-1 had also been issued on this same day.12

Interestingly, these all dealt with “Unconventional Aircraft” and “Flying Discs”, not Soviet aggression.

NOTES:

1. see: Central Intelligence Agency publication,Studies in Intelligence, Volume: 11, Issue: Spring Year: 1967; March Crisis 1948, ACTS I and II, by William R. Harris
2. see: http://www.bluebookarchive.org; use search engine with dates in March, 1948; several cases are in these files beginning on the 5th
3. see: Driven Patriot, ©1992 by Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, page 370: “the War Scare; see: A Preponderance of Power, ©1992 by Melvyn P. Leffler, page 225
4. see: Central Intelligence Agency publication, Studies in Intelligence, Volume: 11, Issue: Spring Year: 1967; March Crisis 1948, ACT II, by William R. Harris; Page 20, "On that Good Friday (the 26th) General Carl S. (Tooey") Spaatz decided that key elements of the U.S. Air Force should be placed on an immediate alert. At 2:37 p.m. Air Force officers in the Pentagon held a telecon with the Alaskan Air Command, for example: 1. It is the decision of the Chiefs of Staff that your aircraft control and warning system operate twenty-four hours a day continuously, commencing at once."; see: The Emerging Shield, copyright 1953-1988, Kenneth Schaffel, for the Office of Air Force History
5. see: The Forrestal Diaries; Edited by Walter Millis; Page 395, “…It is inconceivable that even the gang who run Russia would be willing to take on war…”
6. see: Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: CIA Relations with the Air Force on Estimates of Soviet Intentions, SECRET, 23 December 1948, “…it is quite true, however, that at the time of the preparation of the 60 day estimate for the second meeting of the IAC Directors and of ORE 22-48, the Air Force elements were far more alarmist than any of the others…”
7. see: Operation Downfall, the Devil was in the Details, by D. M. Giangreco, 1995, for informational background on Ennis
8. On file with author: GSCID 452.1; 25 March 1948; Subject: Unconventional Aircraft, “the Intelligence Division has a specific requirement for information regarding the sighting of unconventional aircraft, including the so-called “Flying Discs.”
9. 9a. see: CIA reading room, document number; CIA-RDP80R01731R003400070040-8.pdf, detailing the early stages of the new CIG’s, National Intelligence Survey (NIS); 9b. Central Intelligence Agency publication, Studies in Intelligence, Volume: 11, Issue: Spring Year: 1967; March Crisis 1948, ACT II, by William R. Harris…”While U. S. intelligence agencies hammered out unanimous no-deliberate-war estimates on March 15 and 16, 1948, thus laying to rest the scare raised by General Clay’s “blockbuster” cable of March 5 and closing down the first act of the ‘crisis’...”
10. see: Central Intelligence Agency publication, Studies in Intelligence, Volume: 11, Issue: Spring Year: 1967; March Crisis 1948, ACT II, by William R. Harris; Page 19, paragraph 2, “…I am not expecting any conflagration to break out tomorrow or the next day, by any means”
11. see: Central Intelligence Agency publication, Studies in Intelligence, Volume: 11, Issue: Spring Year: 1967; March Crisis 1948, ACT II, by William R. Harris; Page 20, "On that Good Friday (the 26th) General Carl S. (“Tooey") Spaatz decided that key elements of the U.S. Air Force should be placed on an immediate alert. At 2:37 p.m. Air Force officers in the Pentagon held a telecon with the Alaskan Air Command, for example: 1. It is the decision of the Chiefs of Staff that your aircraft control and warning system operate twenty-four hours a day continuously, commencing at once."
12. see: www. http://www.bluebookarchive.org; several documents dated from March 25, 1948 onward into the nineteen-fifties

Monday, May 2, 2016

For Whom It May Concern: This is my Only Blog

To anyone reading this: This is my only blog. I have no other blogs or web pages!

For a brief period, several years ago, I tried adding a blog dealing with ancient scripture, but I didn't have time to pull it off. It wasn't up for very long.

Since then, I have not done anything else but this blog: GRUDGE...THAT'S IT!

If you see any other web page or blog that says, "By Bob Koford", just know that it has absolutely NOTHING to do with me. ADDED: Actually, I do have a couple of music sites, but not blogs or web pages, especially not any dealing with the paranormal.

Thanks for your time,

the "real" Bob Koford

Wednesday, March 9, 2016

Pertinent Aztec Info - 2

This is quoted from:
the Emerging Shield; the air force and the Evolution of Continental Air Defense 1945-1960
Kenneth Schaffel cr1953-1988

(pages 77-78)


"After moving from the west coast to parcicpate in the war games, the 505th was expected to remain in the east. ADC planned to concentrate its meager radar warning and control resources in the northeastern United States pending approval and funding of the Radar Fence Plan, but its plans were abruptly and drastically altered late in March 1948. With no advanced warning, Headquarters USAF directed that an emergency air defense system be established to operate around the clock in Alaska and the Pacific Northwest. Shortly after, First Air Force in the east was ordered to put its fighter units on alert. The usefulness of this move was uncertain since First Air Force did not yet control the services of the 505th and thus lacked any type of radar warning and control capability. 119

These events began Thursday, March 25, when Spaatz suddenly informed the Air Staff that he wanted Alaskan air defense "augmented" immediately." 120

119 Hist, 1AF, Jan-Jun 1948
120 HQ USAF Interstaff Memo, Brig Gen Edward J. Timberlake to Maj Gen Smuel E. Anderson, Mar 25, 1948, USAFHRC microfilm

Saturday, October 17, 2015

117L_Personnel_Frederic_Oder

This page quoted from:

NAP OPENBOOK
Memorial Tributes: National Academy of Engineering, Volume 12 (2008)
Chapter: Frederic C.E. Oder, Page 228

FREDERIC C. E. ODER
1919-2006
Elected in 1980

"For leadership in conceiving and developing civl and military satellites."

BY VANCE COFFMAN

"FREDERIC C.E. "FRITZ" ODER, colonel, United States Air Force (retired), and former vice president of Lockheed, died May 11, 2006, in Gloucester, Massachusetts, at the age of 86. He was elected to the National Academy of Engineering in 1980"

"Images collected by early satellites gave U.S. presidents photographic evidence of Soviet activities and enabled them to make decisions that had far-reaching implications for America and its allies. ...In 2000, for this and other contributions to national security—many of which remain classified— Fritz was named a pioneer in national reconnaissance and was inducted into the Air Force Space and Missile Pioneers Hall of Fame."

Random 117L Quotes_03

C
0
P
Y
7 AUG 1959
1/4
07/0824Z Aug

CONFIDENTIAL CITE DEP 963459 FROM ARPA SGD CLARK. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY SUBJ PROGRAM IS REDESIGNATED SAMOS. PURPOSE OF NEW DESIGNATION IS TO IDENTIFY RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM WITH INNOCUOUS NAME THAT DOES NOT RPT NOT HAVE MISSION ASSOCIATION. SAMOS NAME IS UNCLASSIFIED. SAMOS USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITE PROGRAM 'ALSO UNCLASSIFIED. HOWEVER, ATTENTION IS INVITED TO FACT THAT INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS MUST BE PROTECTED AS SUCH. ALL PUBLIC STATEMENTS OTHER THAN SIMPLE CONFIRMATION THAT SENTRY HAS BEEN REDESIGNATED SAMOS WILL BE CLEARED WITH ARPA. ALL INFORMATION RELATIVE TO SCHEDULES IS CLASSIFIED. WITHIN CLASSIFIED CHANNELS EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO REDUCE PROGRAM DATA ACCESS AND TO RESTRICT PROGRAM INFORMATION TO A RIGID NEED TO KNOW BASIS. STRICT ADHERENCE TO THESE MEASURES MUST BE EFFECTED. POSITIVE ACTION UNDER APPROPRIATE SECURITY REGULATIONS AND DIRECTIVES WILL BE TAKEN RELATIVE TO UNAUTHORIZED RELEASES. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND TO ALL PERTINENT AGENCIES AND CONTRACTORS.
07/0824Z AUG .

Saturday, October 10, 2015

Random 117L quotes: Vandenberg

Here is another glimpse at the report:



"In June, 1952, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg was quoted in the Washington Post as admitting that the Armed Forces were interested in these objects, and that they were searching for the "saucers." note: article source from the Project Blue Book files, www.bluebookarchives.org

"with the present world unrest we cannot afford to be complacent...Our job is to detect any weapon that might be used against the United States. In the future a weapon that was'probably a meteor' may prove to be a global rocket." He laid out 3 steps of the plan that they had in mind, number three being:
"Radar combined with cameras and telescopes as well as modified sonar to find out why saucers appear soundless."

Again, just as was the case with Colonel Oder's comments after the Green Fireball conference, the description of the needs sought to monitor and analyze the saucers, which General Vandenberg describes, dovetails perfectly with the expanding nature of the monitoring systems that were later honed with WS-117L."

Sunday, September 27, 2015

Random 117L Quotes_01

Note: Highlighted areas are mine-BK


ADVANCED RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT PLAN

Air Force Ballistic Missile Office
Headquarters Air Research Development Command
Special Handling Required


"The results of the numerous studies conducted since1946 at the Direction of the Department of Defense...The concept of the Advanced Reconnaissance Systems a result of studies conducted at the Rand Corporation. A study completed in 1947 together with similar investigations by other contractors concluded that a satellite vehicle was feasible as a reconnaissance vehicle but not as a weapon carrier."